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CHILDREN AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: FAMILY SIZE, GENDER
PREFERENCES AND HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION
- THEORY AND INDIAN CASES
Abstract
In the light of Gary Becker's economic theory of the family, considers how economic cost
and benefit factors can influence the size of families that parents decide to have. Some
support for the importance of such factors is found from results of structured interviews with
wives in Kondh-dominated villages in western Orissa. These results are at variance with the
hypothesis of Malthus about population growth. Factors that may alter the optimal family-
size as development proceeds are discussed. It is found in our sampling that, on the whole,
there is a preference for daughters rather than sons although this is not as strong in the
Kondh-dominated villages as in poor villages in the Santal tribal belt of West Bengal. While
in the Kondh-dominated villages some discrimination in access to education in favour of
boys compared to girls is present, little such or no such discrimination occurs in relation to
access to food and medical attention. In the villages surveyed in the West Bengal Santal tribal
belt, discrimination in favour of boys is more pronounced than in the Kondh-dominated area
in Orissa. While economic considerations help to explain gender discrimination between boys
and girls, we find that social and cultural factors also playa major role. Parents in a similar
economic situation seem to display substantially different patterns of gender discrimination
between children depending on their social and cultural content. It seems that the extent to
which economic theories of the family explain family preferences and behaviour depend
significantly on the social and cultural context in which they are to be applied.
CHILDREN AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: FAMILY SIZE, GENDER
PREFERENCES AND HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION
- THEORY AND INDIAN CASES
1. Introduction and Background
To a large extent, children are the beneficiaries of economic development and the means for
future economic development. Their future productivity is significantly influenced by the
human capital invested in them. Such investment may be in terms of education provided to
them and via adequate health care and nutrition designed to improve their physique and
health (Tisdell, 2000a, b). Furthermore, the size of the family has implications for the level of
income available to its members and for the level of savings of the family and its scope for
capital fonnation.
In addition, the composition of a family is of economic importance. A family with many
dependents or relatively dependent members is likely to have a lower per capita income than
families of the same size with fewer dependents. In some societies, gender composition of
children is also of concern to parents. In patriarchal societies, as mostly occur in India, boys
are usually preferred to girls but in matriarchal societies, some of which also occur in India as
amongst the Kassis, girls may be preferred to boys. Such factors can influence female-male
ratios and the relative access of boys and girls to human capital. When the latter type of
gender-bias is present, it has implications for future economic development.
The purpose of this article is to outline and apply economic theories of the family that may
influence family decisions about the size of the family, its gender composition and
investment in the human capital of children, particularly of boys compared to girls. The
analysis draws mainly on the theory of Becker (1981) and on human capital theory (Mincer
and Polachek, 1974). But it is also contended that economic theories are mediated by cultural
factors. Furthermore, whole-of-life factors and whole-of-life entitlements of children and
parents must be taken into account and these are usually significantly influenced by culturally
determined factors. Field observations from a survey of Kondh tribal-dominated villages in
western Orissa provide a basis for empirical discussion of the analysis (Tisdell et aI., 2002)
along with some observation from a field study of rural villages in the west of the Midnapore
dist11ct of West Bengal.
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2. Decisions about Family Size and Gender Composition of Children
Becker (1981) assumes that parents will make decisions about their family size designed to
maximize a specifiable single utility function that reflects the preferences of parents. His
theory has been described as the unitary theory of the family (Alderman et al., 1995) in
contrast to bargaining theories of the family based on game theory (Alderman et al., 1995;
Haddad et al., 1997; Schultz, 1990). The latter theories explain family decisions in terms of
power play between family members based on a combination of mutual and conflicting
interests mediated by threat possibilities. These theories are as a rule based on types of
rational behaviour assumed in game theory.
However, they may not be as relevant to family decisions about children as unitary theories
(Tisdell et al., 1999). The latter theories may be more applicable to explaining the
socioeconomic status of wives within families but even then, they are subject to considerable
qualification because of the strong influences of cultural and institutional factors (Tisdell et
al.,2001).
Application of the unitary theory does not strictly require that parents have the same shared
utility function. It would still apply if one parent dictatorially imposed his or her utility
function on the other. Strictly also a pure unitary theory is not required to underpin a cost and
demand approach to family size and its gender composition.
In its simplest form, the demand and cost approach to family size and its gender composition
suggests that the size of the family is largely determined by parents weighing up the
economic benefits to be obtained by them from children against their cost. Assuming that the
benefits of parents from having some children exceeds the cost involved, the rationally
determined size of the family in terms of the number of children is that for which the
additional economic benefit of a child equals its extra cost.
This is illustrated in Figure 1. There, line dd' represents the extra economic benefit to parents
of additional children and cc' represents their additional cost. The ideal family size for these
parents is three. In practice, the number of children is discrete so an integer problem will need
to be solved. If, for example, the continuous demand curve and marginal cost curve fitted to
the discrete values is between 2 and 3 children, either 2 or 3 children will be optimal. The
best choice will be found by comparing the net benefit of two children with that for three
2
children, and selecting which of the alternatives gives the higher net benefit. The general
approach is not invalidated. The solution is just a little more complicated. Note that factors
that cause the marginal benefit curve for children to shift downward or the marginal cost
curve to shift upward will reduce the optimal family size. As discussed later, economic
developments may cause systematic changes to occur in these curves.
$
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Figure 1 Marginal benefits and costs of children as detenninants of the size of the family
Given the economic benefit-cost approach to detennining the number of children that parents
will typically decide to have in their family, a most important consideration is what
detennines the relationships shown in Figure 1 and how the position of the curves shown
there may be altered.
The demand curve for children might be influenced by several factors. These include the
anticipated pleasure of having some children, the biological desire to leave descendants, the
desire for social approval from having children, the economic value of the product which
offspring may produce or help to produce, and the possibility that offspring may support their
parents in their old age or if they become infinn. The costs of having children include the
costs of providing them with the necessities of life and investing in their education, health
and welfare generally. Note that the theory also supposes that parents have the ability to
control their number of children (for example by contraception or other means) and that the
economic costs of control are not large.
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Becker's theory contrasts with that of Malthus (1798). T. R. Malthus assumed that families
and population would expand in size until they were limited by the means of subsistence.
This is, however, not true of most families in modern times. Even the relatively poor in India
(see below) rationally limit the sizes of their families. Becker's theory assumes that the
number of children a couple has is basically a rational economic choice.
Apart from the fact that contraception methods are now more widely available and cheaper
than in the past, with economic development, the net benefit to parents of large-sized families
appears to have declined significantly. Education has increasingly become compulsory and
basic education is mostly free or heavily subsidised. In rural areas, this means that children
are less available to assist their parents with work tasks and so the value to parents of their
direct productivity has declined. While basic education is 'free' or heavily subsidised, there
are still extra costs to be borne by parents such as extra clothing costs, school transport cost in
some cases, and in many cases purchase of books. This tends to increase the cost of children.
Medical and health services are also more widely available and parents may be under greater
social pressure than previously to provide these to their children in times of sickness. In the
urban setting, the cost of housing children may also be much higher than in the countryside
and children may have fewer opportunities to contribute to family income than in rural ones.
Thus with development, one would expect smaller families in the countryside and even
smaller ones in urban settings.
Furthermore, in many countries, including India, life expectancies have risen with economic
development. This means that fewer children are required by parents to ensure themselves of
support in old age or if they become infirm. Actually with considerable economIC
development the dependence of parents on their children declines markedly, as in OECD
countries. Either welfare systems are widely available to help support the elderly or infirm or
parents are in a position to provide of their own welfare by insurance and superannuation
schemes; mechanisms that tend to develop with the market economy. In fact, in such
economies, the institution of the family as a cohesive unit tends to be eroded. This is mainly
because family members tend to become geographically mobile in seeking jobs or job
opportunities. Consequently, children and their parents often become scattered
geographically. In developing countries, especially rural areas, such features are as yet less
pronounced.
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In interviews with 106 wives in three Kondh tribal-dominated villages in the west of Orissa
undertaken in 2000, 101 wives responded to a question asking them the ideal number of
children and 5 did not answer [for details about the survey see Tisdell et al., 2002J. Most
(46%) said that 2 was the ideal number and 8% said 3, with 34 % saying 2 or 3 children.
Consequently, 93% of those answering said that 3 or less children is ideal. The main reason
given was that a small family is easily manageable in terms of care, education, food and
clothing. This is consistent with a benefit-cost approach.
The most frequent number of children of the wives interviewed was two and their average
number was a little less than two. Even though these villagers are very poor by Indian
standards, it seems clear that they engaged in careful family planning. A similar situation was
found in four rural villages in the west of the Midnapore District (cf. Tisdell and Roy, 2000).
The family sizes in the Kondh-dominated villages suggests that if anything, slightly negative
population growth is voluntarily occurring, and it is occurring in a situation of considerable
poverty.
Wives in these villages were also asked whether they preferred more sons than daughters,
more daughters than sons or an equal number of sons and daughter. Five did not answer.
Most (62%) preferred an equal number of sons and daughters, 36% preferred more sons than
daughters whereas only one percent preferred more daughters than sons. There is clearly a
bias in favour of sons. The Kondhs and the scheduled-caste Hindus, called Dombs, who live
in some of the Kondh villages, belong to patriarchal societies. The Dombs are generally
servants to the Kondhs and cultural convergence seems to have occurred. Those respondents
who said they prefer more sons than daughters explained that daughters will eventually get
married and go away. In fact, a daughter will go to another village and another family and
will not be able to provide long-term support to her natural parents. So a daughter is likely to
give less economic benefit to her parents, and parents will have to pay a dowry to her parents-
in-law whereas one will be received by them when their son is married. Cost-benefit analysis
is, therefore, capable of explaining some of the bias in favour of sons.
In India, as a whole, there is a strong preferences for boys rather than girls in families and this
is most marked in the north of India (Dyson and Moore, 1983). It is less marked amongst
tribals than non-tribals taken as a whole. Although the Indian female-male ratio fell in the
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20th century according to Indian Census data, it displayed some increase in 2000 according to
the Census. However, this improvement may be largely attributed to increasing life
expectancy. This tends to favour females relative to males. Nevertheless, the female-male
ratio for children under six years continues to decline in India (Konar, 2001). This may be a
result partly of selective abortions and infanticide as well as relative deprivation of female
children.
An interesting variation to the economic theory of family size as illustrated by Figure 1 is
suggested by observations of Bledsoe (1994) for Africa. She found, on the basis of
experience in Sierra Leone, Gambia and Liberia, that there is a strong social demand for large
families in the coastal belt of sub-Saharan Africa, and families remain large. One reason is
that if a child in adulthood does well, economic gains are made by the whole village. But also
the rearing of children is a shared village activity so children are more like common property
than private property of their parents. This means that the cost of rearing individual children
tends to be shared in the village. Therefore the costs falling on the parents may be a fraction
of the total cost of child rearing. Thus in Figure 1 if cc' represents the actual per unit cost of
rearing children, the per-unit cost to parents in West African coastal communities is below
this. Thus parents have an economic incentive to have a greater number of children. In this
case, institutional or cultural factors have a significant influence on the way in which the
economic theory of the family operates.
3. Investment in the Human Capital of Children
Although parents may have preferences for the gender composition of their children, this
need not result in gender discrimination when a child of a particular less preferred sex is
bom. Nevertheless, in some cases, it does result in discrimination according to gender. For
example, sons may be given preference to daughters in education, in access to health care and
in access to food when food is in short supply. This all results in gender differences in
investment in human capital formation in children which in turn affects their future earning
capacity and possibilities for personal independence.
Most rural dwellers seem to be aware of the importance of human capital formation for the
future welfare of their children. In the Kondh-dominated villages surveyed in Orissa, all the
wives (94%) who responded to this question regarded education for their children as very
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The relative lack of discrimination against daughters in the Kondh-dominated villages
contrasts with findings from a similar survey in four rural villages in the west Midnapore
District near Chandrakona Road (Tisdell, 2000a). Some of these villages consisted of Santal
tribals, some of Santals and Hindu Bengalees and still another contained only Hindu
Bengalees. In these villages, there is marked food discrimination in favour of sons and in
access to medical attention. However, such discrimination is less pronounced amongst
Santals than amongst non-Santals, particularly as far as access to medical attention is
concerned.
Interviews were conducted in the second half of 1999 in four rural villages in the west of the
Midnapore District, two of which consisted entirely of Santals, one was a mixture of Santals
and Hindu Bengalees and the fourth was entirely comprised of Hindu Bengalees. In total, 120
wives (or their representatives) were interviewed. Their responses in relation to the foci of
this article are summarised in Table 1. As can be seen, compared to the Kondh-dominated
villages, there is a much stronger preference for sons compared to daughters. Furthermore,
there is much stronger discrimination in favour of sons as far as education, food availability
and medical attention are concerned. Thus patriarchal dominance seems much more
pronounced in these village samples in Santal and Hindu Bengalee communities in west
Midnapore than in Kondh-dominated villages in western Orissa. Further evidence indicates
that the extent of discrimination against girls tends to be stronger amongst Hindu Bengalees
in this region than Santals. The difference is more marked when Santals continue to follow
their Sari religion rather than Hinduism. Where Santals are converted to Hinduism, social
convergence seems to be marked. However, some social convergence towards northern
Hinduistic values occurs for most Santals (cf. Sahu, 1996).
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Table 1
Summary of Responses by Wives (or their representatives) to some Questions Relating to
Children's Affairs in Four Villages in the Midnapore Area of West Bengal
Number Percentage
(%)
Q52 Preference for Sons
a) More sons than daughters preferred 86 71.6
b) More daughters preferred 4 3.3
c) Equal number of each 30 25.1
d) No response - -
Total 120 100
Q57 Number of years of education
a) More years of education for sons than daughters 70 58.3
b) More years for daughters 13 10.8
c) Same for both 17 14.2
d) No response 20 16.7
Total 120 100
Q59 Food availability
a) Sons favoured with food 77 64.1
b) Daughters favoured with food 0 0
c) Equal preference 36 30.0
d) No response 7 6.9
Total 120 100
Q60 Medical Attention
a) Sons favoured for medical attention 60 50
b) Daughters favoured 0 0
c) Treated equally 50 41.6
d) No response 10 8.4
Total 120 100
Source: Author's survey
Thus, daughters in the west Midnapore Santal area surveyed seem to be more deprived of
human capital relative to sons than is so in the west Orissa Kondh-dominated area surveyed.
This is so despite the fact that the economic situation of all these villages seems similar.
Poverty is common to all the villages surveyed, and probably economic deprivation is even
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more marked in the sample from Orissa than that for West Bengal. Hence, differences
between the regions in gender bias in access of children to human capital seem to arise from
variations in cultural factors rather than from any significant difference in economic
conditions. Consequently, application of the economic cost-benefit theory of the family needs
to be varied according to the cultural and social customs that prevail in individual societies. It
is dangerous to apply economic theories of the family without taking thorough account of the
social and cultural context in which they are to be applied. This is because economic theories
of the family are partial rather than holistic theories.
4. Impacts on Economic Welfare and on Development of Gender Discrimination
between Children
Some human capital theorists (e.g. Mincer and Polachek, 1979) have argued that even in
Western societies, maximum economic welfare in the Kaldor-Hicks sense is likely to be
achieved by showing a gender preference for boys in the allocation of investment in human
capital, such as in education. In the absence of such a preference, it is argued that a Kaldor-
Hicks gain would be possible for society, that is the gainers (boys or males in this case) could
compensate the losers (girls or females) and still remain better off than prior to the preference
in access to human capital or education for boys. It is argued that aggregate production or
returns on investment in human capital will be maximised by showing a preference for boys
in the allocation. Furthermore, it is claimed that this does not involve economic
discrimination according to gender but merely reflects the underlying economics. The main
argument in support of this position is that women during child-bearing have their capacity to
participate in the workforce reduced and tend to lose their work skills and slip down the
work-experience ladder. In some societies, also, social restrictions on the ability of wives or
women to work outside the home limit their opportunities to make full use of their human
capital. This is true in some parts of India.
To illustrate the argument, let us consider investment in the education of boys and girls taking
a theoretical example. In Figure 2, line ABC represents the marginal efficiency of capital
invested in the education of a boy and line DEF indicates that invested in the education of a
girl. The line for the marginal rate of return on education of the boy is higher than for the girl.
Therefore, if a limited amount of capital is available for investment in the education of the
boy and the girl, the total retum on the available capital is maximised when more capital is
invested in the education of the boy than the girl. Thus, ifthe available capital for investment
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in education is equal to BE, the total return on the investment is maximised when BG is
allocated to the boy and EG to the girl. Then BG > EG. The necessary condition for
maximising the return from investment in education is that the marginal efficiency or
marginal rate of return be equalised for this investment in the boy and the girl.
Investment in education
of a girl
%
A
Investment in education
of a boy
Marginal efficiency of
capital or rate of return
GE _
Marginal efficiency of
capital or internal rate '\.
of return ~
F c
o
<===, Quantity of investment in girl Quantity of investment in boy c:::::~>
Figure 2 The marginal rate of return from investment in the education (or human capital) of
a boy may be higher than for a girl. Economic efficiency considerations in such
cases would 'bias' the allocation of investment in favour of the boy
While there may be some natural reasons why the private marginal internal rate or investment
in the human capital of a girl tends to be lower on average than that for a boy (mainly due to
the child-bearing role of females), differences may be socially or culturally widened. Females
may in some societies have fewer employment opportunities than males and they may be
required to shoulder the maj or burden of family care. This discrimination in adult life, due to
social and cultural factors, reduces the private return from investment in the education of
females compared to males.
Nevertheless, from a social point of view, it seems important that investment in human
capital be influenced by social returns rather than private returns. It could be argued that
wives as the primary family-carers, generate significant spillover benefits from their
education to their children. There is also evidence that more educated women are likely to
have smaller sized families. Furthermore, better developed women are likely to be in a
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superior position to take care of their families. Thus, from a social point of view, greater
equality seems justified between boys and girls in access to human capital, than appears to be
optimal from a private viewpoint.
Many parents only appropriate a small portion of the benefits from educating their children
and investing in their human capital. Narrow parental self-interest is hard pressed to fully
explain parental behaviour towards their children. Altruism, the desire for social approval,
and according to some biologists, the desire to leave behind genetic successors plays a role in
the support of parents for their children. While economic considerations do help to explain
gender discrimination between boys and girls in some families in India, the explanation is
partial. In some patriarchal communities in India, parents seem less inclined to invest in the
human capital of girls compared to boys on the grounds that the former will leave their family
whereas the latter are likely to stay. The benefits of providing education and other human
capital to a daughter are therefore, viewed by many parents as being external to their family.
However, as has been seen, some communities such as Kondh-dominated ones give less
weight to this factor than others, such as villagers Bengalee Hindu or Santal communities in
the west of Midnapore. Culture can significantly mediate the extent to which narrow
economIC considerations prevail in parental care of children and their access to human
capital.
5. Concluding Comments
While economic theories of the family shed some light on the basis of decisions ab out family
size, gender preference for children and differences in access of daughters and sons to human
capital, they need to be supplemented by sociological considerations. Family decisions are
not purely economic ones. Furthermore, the extent to which economic factors paly a role in
parental decisions about children seem to vary significantly with differences in the cultural
and social setting of the family, as has been illustrated by cases from India.
Nevertheless, economic factors do influence the size of families, and some of the likely
changes in family size as economic development occurs are predictable. At the same time,
social and cultural factors playa major role (sometimes an overriding one) in gender
preferences for children and in discrimination between daughters and sons in their access to
human capital. To reiterate for emphasis: The extent to which economic factors feature in
decisions about the family, particularly decisions about children and their resource
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entitlements, depends on the cultural context in which the family exists. It is dangerous to
apply economic theories of the family without relating these to the social and cultural context
in which they are to be applied.
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